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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SHlFFER v. HEITNER: A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD
STATE COURT JURISDICTION
In overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins did not merely overrule a venerable case.
It
overruled a particularway of looking at law which dominated
the judicial process long after its inadequacies had been

laid bare.
Justice Felix Frankfurterin Guaranty Trust v. York'
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observation is equally suited to the overruling of the century-old case, Pennoyer v. Neff,2 by the recent decision
in Shaffer v. Heitner3 Shaffer ended not only Pennoyer's reign, but
also a jurisdictional perspective which rested on the distinction between
in personam and in rem jurisdiction and the concept of a state's sovereignty over property within its borders. The basis of the Pennoyer doctrine was the concept that a state had authority over all persons and
property within its territory, and no authority whatsoever outside its
territorial limits.' Modifying previous theory slightly,5 Pennoyer be1. 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
4. The concepts of in personam and in rem jurisdiction are found in the earliest
American decisions; their basis before that is unknown. Other notions basic to Pennoyer, such as the exclusivity of each state's jurisdiction, are taken from the work of
Justice Story and his application of European concepts of national sovereignty. These
principles were popular in the early years of the United States because of sharp conflict
between states and their intention to remain distinct legal and political entities. See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241
[hereinafter cited as Hazard].
5. In the Pennoyer opinion, Justice Field noted the necessity for a state to determine certain status questions involving its own citizens. For example, a state has the
authority to determine the validity of the marriage of one of its citizens, regardless of
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came the standard, prescribing all state jurisdictional procedures until,
in 1945, International Shoe v. Washington6 delineated a new test for
in personam actions. Since that time, Pennoyer has continued to serve
7
as the paradigm for in rem proceedings.
The variety of litigants and the diverse situations naturally found
in a civil system created a complex framework around the basic
doctrine. The most oblique of these developments was the evolution
of quasi in rem theory, which allowed the seizure of a nonresident's
property in order to satisfy a claim unrelated to that property.8 In certain applications, the theory is valid; for example, where a party goes
into seclusion or moves out of state to avoid creditors and the jurisdiction of the courts, seizure of any property remaining in the state is a
fair method of satisfying valid claims against him. A state has the right
and duty to provide its residents with a remedy for debts where the
debtor is conspicuously absent and refuses to submit himself to the
forum for a court determination of his liability.'
Nevertheless, the commercial complexities of the twentieth century provided an opportunity for severe abuse of the procedure. Intan2
1
gible obligations,' 0 contingent debts, even non-transferable interests'
the residence of the spouse. The decision also permitted the exercise of jurisdiction over
any person or corporation doing business in the state. 95 U.S. at 734-36.
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. See generally Hazard, supra note 4. The Supreme Court's generic use of the
term, "in rem" includes quasi in rem proceedings. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2577-78 n.17.
8. See Ownby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
See generally Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 73
COLum. L REV. 749 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Folk & Moyer].
9. The Shaffer Court indicated that evasive debtors could be policed adequately
through current in personam theories. The Court noted first that the state could attach
the property while awaiting judgment in the proper forum, citing North Georgia Fimishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
663 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969). The Court proposed that the debtor who seeks to avoid judgment
by removing his property to another jurisdiction could be thwarted by the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution, art. IV, §1, which allows enforcement in other states
of any valid judgment obtained in the forum state. 97 S. Ct. at 2583 nn.35 & 36. See
note 55 infra. See also Hazard, supra note 4, at 266-67.
10. Intangibles are those holdings which have no intrinsic value, but which represent
a property interest. Examples are stock certificates, bonds, promissory notes, and insurance policies. See Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1156-59 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Von Mehren &
Trautman]. See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Harris
v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
11. Contingent debts are those conditioned on the occurrence of some future event
which is not certain to occur. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
12. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
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became a valid basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction in cases where the
defendant's relation to the forum state was nil. The abuse reached its
critical point in the facts of Shaffer, and resulted in the abandonment

of the Pennoyer theory for the more viable "minimum contacts"
standard of InternationalShoe."3

As indicated in the opening quote,

this change signifies more than the mere replacement of Pennoyer with
a more modem standard, or a single enlargement of minimum contacts'
application. It expresses the adoption of a new attitude toward state
court jurisdiction; the Court has de-emphasized the importance of the
res in the realization that no matter what the object of the litigation,

14
the subject is always the determination of personal rights.
After analyzing the Shaffer decision, this note will discuss its effect
on in rem and quasi in rem actions, and the possible backlash by state
courts reacting to a limitation on their jurisdiction. It will conclude
with an examination of the minimum contacts test and the possibility
of its modification in light of the recent decision.

I.
A.

THE SHAFFER V. HEITNER DECISION

The Facts

On May 22, 1974, Mark Heitner 1 r filed a shareholder's derivative
13. The best expression of and authority for that standard is found in the Court's
opinion:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463. See Holmes, J. in McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90, 91. Compare Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316,
319. See Blackmer v. United States, 248 U.S. 421; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352; Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253.
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 25 U. CmI. L. REv. 569 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kurland]; Note, Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. Rnv. 909 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Developments].
14. See 97 S. Ct. at 2581-82, and nn.22 & 23 infra. In Lynch v. Household Finance,
405 U.S. 538 (1972), the Court decreed that "the dichotomy between personal liberties
and property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights."
Id. at 552. See also Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 345, 316 P.2d
960, 964-65 (1957), cert. denied sub nom. American Federation of Musicians v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 795-800; Hazard, supra note
4, at 281-88; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tx. L. Rnv. 655, 66364 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Traynor]; Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at
1164-79.
15. The plaintiff was a minor and was represented in the action by his father,
Arnold Heitner. Both were citizens of New York State.
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suit in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware, naming as defendants Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary,
Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers or
directors of the corporations. The parent company, Greyhound, was
incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business in Arizona. Greyhound Lines, Inc., was incorporated in California
and also had Arizona as its principal place of business. The complaint
alleged that the individual defendants had conducted operations in
Oregon that resulted in successful civil antitrust'0 and criminal contempt 17 actions against the parent and the subsidiary. The plaintiff's
standing was based on his ownership of one share of Greyhound stock.' 8
Plaintiff Heitner was not a citizen of Delaware.' 9 He apparently
chose his forum on the basis of Greyhound's incorporation there, and
on the availability of Delaware's sequestration statute which would compel defendants' appearance in that state.20 In accordance with Delaware procedure, 2 ' plaintiff filed a motion for an order of sequestration,
designating the res as all shares of Greyhound stock and options
thereon belonging to any of the individual defendants. The sequestrator 22 then seized approximately 82,000 shares of Greyhound common

16. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977).
Plaintiffs were awarded $13,146,090 plus attorneys' fees in the treble damage antitrust
action.
17. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (finding
of contempt), 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. IlM. 1974) (fines imposed), affd, 508 F.2d 529
(7th Cir. 1974). Fines of $100,000 and $500,000 respectively, were levied against
Greyhound Corp. and its wholly-owned subsidiary Greyhound Lines.
18. 97 S. Ct. at 2572.
19. See note 15 supra.
20. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366(a) (1974) which provides:
If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that the defendant or any one or more of the defendants is a nonresident of the State, the
Court may make an order directing such nonresident defendant or defendants
to appear by a day certain to be designated. .... The Court may compel the
appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part of his property,
which property may be sold under the order of the Court to pay the demand
of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear or otherwise defaults. Any
defendant whose property shall have been so seized and who shall have entered
a general appearance in the cause may, upon notice to the plaintiff, petition
the Court for an order releasing such property or any part thereof from the
seizure.
21. After the sequestration petition is filed, the plaintiff must offer an affidavit stating that the individual defendants are nonresidents of Delaware. Both the plaintiff and
the sequestrator, see note 22 infra, must then file $1,000 bonds to assure their compliance with court orders. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 754-57.
22. The court-appointed sequestrator serves the notice of sequestration and a copy
of the court's order on the resident agent of the corporation. In Shaffer, as in most
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stock belonging to nineteen of the defendants and options belonging

to two others, the total value of which was over $1.2 million.2"

Ap-

parently, none of the certificates representing the stock was physically

present in Delaware;24 nonetheless it was deemed situated there by
state statute.
The twenty-one defendants whose property was seized made a
special appearance to challenge jurisdiction, maintaining that the ex
parte sequestration procedure denied them the procedural safeguards
required under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,28 and related
2
casesY.
Defendants also disputed jurisdiction on the basis that the

minimum contacts requirement of InternationalShoe was applicable.
These arguments failed to sway the Court of Chancery, 28 or, on appeal,
the Delaware Supreme Court. 29 The trial court emphasized the quasi
in rem nature of the proceeding and the inapplicability of defendants'

procedural safeguards argument. Moreover, the Delaware Supreme
Court specifically noted at the outset that although the constitutional
issues raised in Sniadach were involved, International Shoe and the
minimum contacts test were not relevant because the proceeding was
quasi in rem. 30 Ironically, the United States Supreme Court utilized

a reciprocal analysis in its reversal of the Delaware decision: Since
Delaware jurisdiction failed to meet the minimum contacts standard,

it was unnecessary to consider the Sniadach-procedural safeguards
problem.
cases, the notice is accompanied by a stop-transfer order which prohibits the corporation
from recognizing any transfer of the shares of record pending further notification from
the sequestrator or the court. ,See Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 755.
23. 97 S. CL at 2574 n.7.
24. Id. at 2574. That seven of the named defendants escaped Delaware's jurisdiction
was an important factor in the Court's conclusion. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
25. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974) provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction
of all courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs
of ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws
of this State, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this State.
26. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
27. Defendants' due process arguments were founded on Supreme Court pronouncements that invalidated the garnishment of wages without notice and an opportunity to
be heard, Id., and the repossession of chattels without a hearing, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972). See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
28. Heitner v. Greyhound Corp., No. 4514 (Del. Ch. filed May 22, 1974).
29. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
30. Id. at 229.
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The Decision

Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the 7-1 opinion for the court.8 1
Before addressing the questions at bar, the Court examined the history

and development of state court jurisdiction and noted the dissimilarity
of the two theories upon which such jurisdiction could be based.

As

set forth in Pennoyer, all jurisdiction arises from the notion of state sovereignty over property and persons within the state.32 But in personam
jurisdiction broke away from Pennoyer in a series of decisions3 8 that

responded to increased individual mobility and to the growth of interstate corporate activity in twentieth century United States.

Culminat-

ing in the rule announced in InternationalShoe, the concept of personal
jurisdiction was to rest on the relationship between the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation, rather than on the mutually exclusive sover-

eignty of each state. 34 The new in personam concepts matured and,
31. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun joined Justice
Marshall in the opinion. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion, agreeing both that
International Shoe should govern in rem as well as in personam actions, and that Delaware lacked sufficient contacts to exercise in personam jurisdiction in the case at bar.
He differed from the majority, however, in his opinion that quasi in rem theory should
be preserved to allow certain jurisdiction over nonresident owners of real property in
actions unrelated to the property. 97 S. Ct. at 2587. Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment, but agreed with Justice Powell that the decision should stop short of discarding
in rem jurisdiction where real property was concerned. He stated further that the decision answered far more than necessary to resolve the issues presented in Shaffer, Id.
Justice Brennan approved the total application of International Shoe to state court
jurisdiction, but dissented both from the majority's consideration of the issue of Delaware's minimum contacts, and from the finding that none existed. Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
32. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). See Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2576-77; International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Hazard, supra note 4, at 24548.
33. The first of these was Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), which formulated
the fiction of a nonresident motorist "appointing" a state official, usually the Secretary
of State, to act as his agent to receive service of process for any action resulting fiom
the nonresident's use of the highways. Judge Learned Hand further limited the Pennoyer doctrine, and provided the groundwork for International Shoe, in Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930). In that decision, Judge Hand coined the
"minimum contacts" term later employed in International Shoe, and now in Shaffer.
See references cited in note 13, supra, for further discussion of these and other related
decisions.
34. The formula which looks to the relationship between the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation is derived from the following passages in InternationalShoe:
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities
of the corporation there have been not only continuous and systematic, but also
give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.. . . Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a
state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes
of action unconnected with activities there, . . . To require the corporation
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with developments such as long arm statutes, 5 state courts were able
to extend their jurisdictional reach.
Meanwhile, in rem concepts were also expanding. Harris v.
Balk"6 had set forth the rule to be applied where the res was intan-

gible;8' that the situs of the debt moved with the person of the debtor.
Thus, if jurisdiction were obtained over the debtor, the debt could be
seized and applied to a claim against the nonresident creditor. In spite

of fair results on occasion, 8 the Harrisrule has been the target of much
40
criticism,3 9 and has been applied only rarely in some jurisdictions.
But the rule still survived until the Shaffer decision, and provided the
groundwork for the series of cases initiated by Seider v. Roth.4

These

cases, which reach what may be the extreme limits of quasi in rem application, approved the attachment of nonresident motorists' liability
42
policies to adjudicate claims arising from an out-of-state accident.
in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdictiofi where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too
great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process.
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those
which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. . . . Whether due
process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate
that a state may make a binding judgment in personam against an individual
or corporate defendant with whch the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
326 U.S. at 317, 319 (citations omitted).
35. See notes 92-99 infra and accompanying text.
36. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
37. See note 10 supra for definition of intangibles.
38. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 779-95.
39. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 120 n.1 (2d Cir. 1968). See
generally Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm :Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533, 583-85, [hereinafter cited as Currie]; Folk & Moyer
supra note 8, at 787-88; Hazard, supra note 4, at 278-81, 285; Von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 10, at 1177-78.
40. Oklahoma, for example, has invoked Harris v. Balk only once. See St. Louis
& S.F.R. Co. v. Crews, 51 Okla. 144, 149, 151 P. 879, 881 (1915).
41. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
42. Citing the need to provide a local forum for its citizens, New York courts would
"seize" the obligations of the insurance policies, disregarding the fact that they had not
yet matured. The duty to defend the insured arose only when a lawsuit, including a
valid assertion of jurisdiction, had been filed against the policy-holder. Furthermore,
the defense fund was nontransferable, and thus could not be used to satisfy any award
to the plaintiff. The duty to indemnify arose only after a judgment had been entered
against the insured. In that neither of these "debts" existed before the suit commenced,
basing jurisdiction on them has been labeled "an exercise in bootstrapping" by many
commentators. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 211, -, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315-17 (Burke,
I., dissenting); Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969); Min-
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Typified by Seider-like situations, the development and continued
use of the two distinct jurisdictional theories subjected defendants to
extreme exposure in remote forums. 43 Moreover, old in rem theories

produced results inconsistent with the due process notions embodied
in the newer in personam theory. 44 Refuting the contention that a pro-

ceeding "against" property is distinct from a proceeding against the
property's owner, commentators have long suggested that in personam
jurisdiction was sophisticated enough for states to rely on it entirely and

abandon the concept of the res. 45 But, in spite of voluminous disparagement of Pennoyer and its corollaries, in rem procedure was still

popular in state courts, 46 although exceptions had become more comichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp.
1044 (1973); Javorek v. Larson, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768, 552 P.2d 728 (1976); Turner v.
Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973); Simpson v. Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d
305, 238 N.E.2d 319 (1967); Matter of Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436
(1962). See also Siegel, JurisdictionAd Infinitum: New York's "Rem" Seizure of the
Insurance Policy For Jurisdiction in Accident Cases, 20 INT. & ComP. L. Q. 99 (1971);
Note, Javorek v. Larson: Automobile Insurer's Obligations to Defend and Indemnify
Insufficient to Establish Jurisdiction--Sieder Sours in California, 12 TULsA L.J. (1977). Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 58
(1968).
43. Not only were people subject to lawsuits in states they had never entered, as in
Seider, but they were also subject to the plaintiff's forum shopping; that is, finding a
state with laws favorable to his case regardless of the citizenship of the parties. See
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934); Ehrenzweig, CONFLICTS OF
LAws 100 n.9 (1962).
44. These notions include adequate notice to the defendant in the form of personal
service of process, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
and a pre-seizure hearing where property is to be attached, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 387 (1969). See also Folk & Moyer,
supra note 8, at 756-57; Hazard, supra note 4, at 252-53.
In spite of the above decisions, few courts have expressed the due process shortcomings of the Pennoyer theory directly. Several courts, however, have felt the need
to support quasi in rem actions in terms of fairness and minimum contacts. See, e.g.,
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1969) (en bane), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 346, 316 P.2d 960,
965 (1957), cert. denied sub nom. American Federation of Musicians v. Atkinson, 357
U.S. 569 (1958). See also Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 781 and n.186.
45. See note 14 supra. See also note 55 infra for discussion of in personam counterparts to in rem actions.
46. Traynor, supra note 14, cites Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316
P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied sub nom. American Federation of Musicians v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), to illustrate state courts' continued reliance on in rem theory.
In Atkinson, the trial court relied on a statute that deemed California to be the fictional
situs of a New York trust in order to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction, although in personam jurisdiction would have been more logical. All parties had substantial contacts
with California, plaintiffs were residents of California, the trust consisted of payment
for work done in California, and the major elements of the transaction occurred in California. Jurisdiction was upheld on appeal, but on an in personam basis. Professor
Traynor noted: "It seemed as irrational to resolve the problem by assigning a fictional
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mon recently. 47
Citing this increasing polarity between legal theorists and state
court practices, and noting its own decisions questioning in rem procedure,48 the Court concluded it must reconsider the theory of state court
jurisdiction to determine the propriety of Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction over Shaffer and his co-defendants. Accordingly, the Court resolved the questions at bar in a two-step analysis: First, an examination
of the proposition that all jurisdiction should henceforth be governed
by the standard of International Shoe. Second, an application of the
new standard to the facts of Shaffer.
C. InternationalShoe as Governing Standard
The Court's acceptance of InternationalShoe as the test for in rem
proceedings rested on its recognition that jurisdiction over a thing is
nothing more than jurisdiction over the interests of persons in that
thing. 49 Once that premise is accepted, it follows that any action in
rem must also satisfy the standard for jurisdiction over the persons who
are interested in the res, and this standard is the minimum contacts test
as set forth in InternationalShoe.
The Court was quick to note that most of the actions currently
brought in rem would remain viable under the International Shoe
standard. The presence of property in a state probably will be a sufficient link between a nonresident owner and the forum, especially
where the property is itself the object of the controversy.
Moreover,
situs to intangibles as it would to pin a tail blindfolded to a nonexistent donkey." Traynor, supra note 14, at 662-63.
47. See U.S. Industries v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), petition for cert.
docketed, No. 76-359; Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3d Cir.
1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397
(1976); Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz. App. 288, 401 P.2d 743 (1965); Atkinson v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied sub nom. American Federation of Musicians v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
48. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
49. 97 S. Ct. at 2582. The phrase is borrowed from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (1971), which in turn borrowed it from Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
See also note 45 supra.
50. 97 S.Ct. at 2581-82. Five justices stated that where the property was totally
unrelated to the litigation, minimum contacts would be lacking. Justices Powell and
Stevens disagreed. See note 31 supra. Also note that while in rem concepts ignore the
distinction between real and personal property, the minimum contacts standard will yield
jurisdiction mudh more readily over real property than over chattels,
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the litigation need not concern ownership; it may relate to negligence
claims, 5 1 tax assessments, 52 or other rights and duties arising from

ownership.

3

But, where the property is completely unrelated to the

plaintiff's cause of action, jurisdiction would probably be denied under
the minimum contacts test. Thus, the mere presence of property would

no longer necessarily result in jurisdiction if InternationalShoe were
to be applied.

The Court then turned to consider four arguments against the
termination of in rem jurisdiction.

First, in rem jurisdiction prevents

a property owner from evading liability by placing his assets in a jurisdiction where he is not subject to an in personam action. 54 The weakness of this argument is its failure to distinguish those who actually at-

tempt to avoid their legal obligations from those who are nonresidents
for other legitimate reasons.

The Court pointed out that alternate pro-

cedures such as those available under the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution 55 should provide sufficient control over the evasive
landowner or debtor. Where a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction

is constitutionally objectionable, an indirect assertion through the use
of in rem concepts should be equally impermissible.

A second argument in favor of in rem jurisdiction is the'security
inherent in it as compared to the uncertainty of the minimum contacts
test;5 a plaintiff can rely on the availability of a local forum if the de-

fendant owns property within the state. The Court answered this ar51. See, e.g., Junior Spice, Inc. v. Turbotville Dress, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
52. See Davenport v. Ralph N. Peters & Co., 386 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
53. These other rights and duties include the enforcement of judicial liens, removal
of clouds upon title, mortgages, establishments of trusts, and determination of rights to
trust property or income. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 782-83.
54. 97 S. ACt at 2583. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 66,
Comment a (1971).
55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, provides in part: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
From this, state B must honor any valid judgment in state A by reducing it to local
judgment and enforcing it. See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: AN
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doe. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 793-829 (1972).
Another alternative to quasi in rem seizure is federal interpleader under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1335 (1970), with nationwide service of process available under 28 U.S.C. § 2361
(1970), or interstate interpleader in state courts. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 348, 316 P.2d
960, 966 (1957), cert. denied sub nom. American Federation of Musicians v. Atkinson,
357 U.S. 569 (1958); von Mehren &Trautman, supra note 10, at 1157-59.
56. 97 S. Ct. at 2584. Because minimum contacts is a qualitative standard, see note
34 supra, litigants cannot be certain jurisdiction exists until the court so determines. See
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gument by pointing out that the fairness standard of InternationalShoe

would overcome this problem in most cases,5" and that if the certainty
of in rem jurisdiction was gained at the price of "fair play and substantial justice," the cost was too great.58

A third argument favoring retention of in rem jurisdiction was dispensed with in footnote.5 Conceding the fact that in rem jurisdiction
had the advantage of limiting a defendant's potential liability to the
value of the property seized, the Court countered that the size of the
claim was unrelated to the question of fairness in subjecting a defendant
to a state court's jurisdiction."0
Finally, the Court addressed what may have been the biggest
hurdle-the long history of jurisdiction based solely on the presence
of property-the tradition itself."' To the degree that the concept of
the state as a quasi-sovereign polity is now further eroded, the Shaffer
decision may prove a bitter pill for state courts to swallow. Nevertheless, the mandate is unmistakable.62 The Court concluded that in rem
jurisdiction has outlived its usefulness. It is an "ancient form" which
fails to recognize that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is
Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 767. In the instant case, Mr. Justice Powell argued for
the retention of quasi in rem theory for some actions to insure a local forum. 97 S.
Ct. at 2587.
57. 97 S.Ct. at 2584. See generally note 31 supra.
58. Id. But see 97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 2582 n.23.
60. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-90 (1971), in which the Court disallowed
a claim that the defendants were not entitled to a hearing prior to the seizure of their
stove, stereo, and other household goods because those items were not absolute necessities of life.
Also note that while in rem theory does limit recovery to the value of the res, the
plaintiff is not thereafter barred from prosecuting another action based upon the same
claim, if he can obtain in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. See Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266 (1935); Note, Developments in the Law-Res
.udicata, 65 HAiv.L. Rv. 818, 834 (1952).
61. 97 S. Ct. at 2584. See note 4 supra.
62. There may be some disagreement as to just how far the Shaffer decision goes
in eliminating old notions of in rem jurisdiction. Six of the eight justices participating
agreed that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 97 S. Ct. at 2584-85. See
id. at 2588 for Justice Brennan's concurrence on this point. The Court, in footnote,
then overruled inconsistent portions of Pennoyer, Harris v. Balk and any other prior decisions. Id. at 2585 n.39. Only Justices Powell and Stevens believed that quasi in rem
concepts should be partially retained, and they so expressed in concurring opinions. Id.
at 2587-88; thus there were no dissents to the future application in toto of International
Shoe. Moreover, the Court made thirteen references to noted critics of in rem theory.
Id. at 2581 (passim). Five of the seven sources noted favor InternationalShoe as the
single standard. See notes 4, 8 & 14 supra. The voting, the language of the decision,
and the commentaries cited all ordain International Shoe as the single jurisdictional
standard. But see note 114 infra.
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essentially an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner,68 and allows a
practice that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.

As such, the

Court reasoned, it must give way to a more modem concept consistent
with current notions of fair play and substantial justice.
D. The New Test Applied
Now satisfied that the standard of International Shoe would be
appropriate for in rem proceedings, the Court shifted its focus to Dela-

ware and the facts of Shaffer. Delaware's jurisdiction had been based
solely on the fiction that defendants' shareholdings in Greyhound Corporation constituted property holdings in the state, even though the certificates representing the shares were located elsewhere. 64 Furthermore, the shares were neither the subject of the litigation nor related
to the underlying cause of action.6 5 It was clear, therefore, that Delaware had only attempted to exert quasi in rem jurisdiction, which was
now insufficient under InternationalShoe.

The majority then considered an arguably extraneous question:
whether Delaware had jurisdiction under the newly imposed minimum

contacts standard of International Shoe. They concluded that minimum contacts were lacking-an opinion labeled as "purely advisory"

by the dissent. 66 The majority justified its accessory decision by noting
that in spite of the quasi in rem nature of the original action, the Dela-

ware notice procedures would be sufficient to compel defendants' appearance if minimum contacts existed.67 Hence, the Court would now
decide if they did, in fact, exist.
63. 97 S. Ct. at 2581. See also note 49 supra and accompanying text.
64. 97 S. Ct. at 2574. See notes 24 & 25 supra and accompanying text.
65. The initial lawsuit was an action for damages against the defendants for causing
Greyhound to be involved in antitrust actions. See notes 16 & 17 supra and accompanying text. Most actions brought under DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974) were unrelated
to the sequestered property. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 784-89.
66. 97 S. Ct. at 2588. (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Advisory opinions
have been held unconstitutional under the "cases and controversies" limitation on the
federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. I. See GuNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW,
1535-44 (9th ed. 1975). See also Frankfurter, Advisory Opinion, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE Soc. Sci. 475 (1930); Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203
(1949); Note, JudicialDeterminationsin Non-Adversary Proceedings,72 HARv. L. REV.
723 (1959); Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARV. L.
RaV. 1302 (1956).
67. In accordance with DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974), the court clerk sent each
of the defendants a copy of the summons and complaint by certified mail; return receipts
were receifed for at least 19 of the 28 defendants. This is sufficient notice for in personam jurisdiction under Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). See 97 S. Ct. at 2585 n.40.
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In his appellee brief, Heitner contended that minimum contacts
were present because appellants had availed themselves of the benefits
and protection of the Delaware forum by incorporating there.0 8 He

argued that this gave Delaware a strong interest in being able to exert
jurisdiction to oversee the management of local corporations and to define the obligations of corporate officers and directors.

However, the

Court, looking to Delaware statutes, found no such interest expressed.
The sequestration statute 9 which was employed to assert jurisdiction
could be used against any nonresident owning property in Delaware.
Moreover, Delaware law70 failed to secure jurisdiction over corporate
fiduciaries who did not own property in Delaware; in the instant case,
seven of the defendants named in the original complaint escaped the
Delaware court's authority because they owned no stock in Grey-

hound.71 The statutes' inability to reach all fiduciaries, and their lack
of specific language revealing any such intent, indicated that the Delaware legislature perceived no strong interest in obtaining jurisdiction
over corporations registered there.72
Even if that interest were present, the Court continued, it must
be determined that Delaware is a fair forum for the litigation.
Heitner's reasoning proved at best that Delaware law should apply to
any controversy over the actions of fiduciaries in their corporate capacities. 73 The fact that a state's law is applicable is not a grant of jurisdiction; rather, jurisdiction must be predicated upon the acts of the defendants.7 4 To that end, appellee Heitner argued that the appellants
68. 97 S. Ct. at 2585.
69. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974). See note 20 supra. See also 97 S. Ct. at
2575-76.
70. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1976).
71. See 97 S. Ct. at 2585-86 & n.43.
72. See Folk & Moyer supra note 8, at 751-54 for a discussion of the statutes history.
Note that DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 1341, see note 108 infra, replacing DEL. CODE tit. 10,
§ 366 (1974) specifically refers to the legislative intent to exercise jurisdiction over Delaware corporations and their officers and directors.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op CoN_.rcT oF LAws § 309 (1971) generally requires
that the law of the state of incorporation be applied to actions concerning the liabilities
of officers and directors to the corporation and its stockholders. Some states, however,
are at variance. New York has held that its law governs corporations doing business
in New York. See Schwarz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, 110 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940);
In re Burnett-Clarke, Ltd., 56 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1932). See also CAL. Copp'. CODE
§ 2115 (West 1977).
74. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), set forth the rule: "[lit is essential
in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protection of its laws." Id. at 253. See also International Shoe v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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had acted affirmatively in accepting positions as officers and directors
of a Delaware corporation, and had received substantial advantages
under that state's law.h
The Court disagreed. Again, this factor indicated only the applicability of Delaware law, not the suitability of Delaware as a forum.
Appellants had done nothing to "purposely avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.' 76 Because Delaware had not enacted a statute that treated acceptance of a directorship
as consent to jurisdiction, 77 defendants had no reason to expect the imposition of Delaware's authority by virtue of their relation to Greyhound Corporation. As to the ownership of Greyhound securities, the
Court observed: "[ilt strains reason . . . to suggest that anyone buying securities in a corporation formed in Delaware 'impliedly consents'
to subject himself to Delaware's . . . jurisdiction on any cause of
action."78 And as appellants were not required to purchase securities
in order to hold their jobs 7 9 -seven did not-the purchase of securities
should not deprive them of the right to be subjected only to the jurisdiction of those states with which they had minimum contacts.
Thus, the Court concluded that Delaware had no jurisdiction over
Shaffer and his co-defendants under either quasi in rem or in personam
theories. The statute that provided quasi in rem jurisdiction had been
declared unconstitutional, and the ties between appellants, the litigation, and the forum were insufficient to establish the minimum contacts
now necessary for jurisdiction.
II.

SHAFFER'S EFFECT

The full extent of the Shaffer decision is, as yet, unclear. Nevertheless, several immediate points may be derived from the Court's language. Most actions formerly pursued in rem should still be viable
under a minimum contacts standard. Surely, when the lawsuit con75. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 143 (1974) provides that employees and officers may receive interest-free, unsecured loans when, in the judgment of the directors, the loan may
be reasonably expected to benefit the corporation. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 145 (1974 &

Supp. 1976) allows for the indemnification, including legal expenses, of officers, directors, employees, or agents acting in a corporate capacity, and for insurance for any acts
arising out of the relationship with the corporation which are not covered by the indemnity provisions.
76. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
77. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-322 (1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-33
(1975); S.C. CODE § 12-361 (1962).
78. 97 S. Ct. at 2586 (quoting Folk & Moyer, supra note 8, at 785).
79. 97 S. Ct. at 2585-86; DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1976).
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cerns the actual ownership or control of local property, this will be
true. 0 Quasi in rem actions, however, will meet a divided fate.
Where the plaintiff is attempting to enforce a duty or incident based

upon the ownership of the property, but not the title itself, the court
will no doubt have jurisdiction to resolve the dispute,"' even in the ab2

sence of the defendant, assuming that proper notice is provided.
On the other hand, those quasi in rem actions involving the attachment of local property of, or obligations owed to, a nonresident

claimant appear to be invalid under Shaffer.8

Certainly those actions

where local property is seized merely as the basis of jurisdiction are

now impermissible.84 So, too, should the attachment of contingent liabilities s5 and unattachable obligations8 6 now be defunct, although the
Court did not specifically address these points in Shaffer.

The territorial aspect of quasi in rem theory will no doubt remain.
Although the presence of property is no longer in itself a basis for jurisdiction, it may indicate that the defendant has availed himself of the
benefit and protection of the laws of the forum sufficiently to justify
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.r A second remnant of the
theory may persist where the plaintiff can demonstrate the probable
necessity of pre-judgment attachment of a nonresident's local property
as surety for a judgment in plaintiff's favor.8 8 Although sufficient contacts may be lacking to submit the nonresident defendant to the state's

jurisdiction, his local property could be sequestered or attached while
the case is heard in the proper forum.

This would retain some

measure of the security formerly provided by quasi in rem seizures.8 9
80. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text. See also 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
81. Id.
82. See notes 44, 67 supra.
83. But see Justice Stevens's concurring opinion, in which he expresses uncertainty
as to the reach of the Shaffer decision. 97 S. Ct. at 2588.
84. Id. at 2582-85. But see note 114 infra.
85. As in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966), where New York
compelled the appearance of a defendant, to face a claim arising from an accident there
by attaching his insurance company's contingent obligation to indemnify him. The
court was not swayed by the fact that the obligation arose only when a valid judgment
had been levied. See notes 41 & 42 supra and accompanying text. But see note 114
infra.
86. See note 42 supra.
87. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957). See also 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
88. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal.
1977). See also Hazard, supra note 4, at 282-83.
89. For the same reason that the qualitative minimum contacts test is uncertain (see
note 56 supra), quasi in rem jurisdiction is reliable: if the res is within the territory
of the court, jurisdiction exists. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2587-88 (Powell,
J. and Stevens, J., concurring). But see Hazard, supranote 4, at 252-62.
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The fact that many of the actions formerly pursued under in rem
or quasi in rem theories may still be brought upon alternative bases
of jurisdiction, and the fact that certain types of attachment proceedings
and other quasi in rem notions have been retained, might permit the
conclusion that Shaffer has only partially replaced Pennoyer, leaving
in rem and quasi in rem as valid, though somewhat diminished, jurisdictional concepts. This view, however, mistakes the correlation in
results for equivalence of the theoretical components of each form of
jurisdiction. It is simply that, in the Court's view, in personam "does
not ignore the fact that the presence of property in a State may bear
on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum
State, the defendant, and the litigation."9 0 Thus, although the situs
of property remains a factor, it is applied from a different perspective.
Further, the Court leaves no doubt as to what this perspective is, or
when it must be applied: "We therefore conclude that all assertions of
state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny." 9' 1

EI.

STATE COURT BACKLASH

States will no doubt attempt to regain the jurisdictional ground lost
in Shaffer, and a variety of approaches will be available to that end.
Most obvious are the "long arm statutes" now in force in several
states.9 2 Originally enacted to subject nonresidents to local jurisdiction
90. 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
91. Id. at 2584. The Court added in a footnote that-to the extent they were inconsistent with Shaffer-Pennoyer, Harris v. Balk, and ensuing cases were now overruled. 97 S. Ct. at 2584 n.39.
92. State long arm or single-act statutes include: ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199 (1974);
ARx. STAT. ANN. § 27-2502 (1967); CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 417.20 (West 1969);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b (West 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.071 (West 1969);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1 (1971); IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1969); IowA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West 1976); KEN. REv. STAT.
§ 188.020 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3201 (West 1963); MAINE REv. STAY. tit. 14,
§ 704-A (1976); MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-304 (1974); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West 1976); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 13-3-57, 13-3-63 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.200 (Vernon 1976); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 4(D)(2) (1975); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-535 (1975); NaV. REV.
STAT. § 14.065 (1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510:4 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3-16 (1970); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ lA-1 (1975); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.20 (Baldwin 1971); OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 187 (1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 15.190 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8301
(Purdon 1976); S.C. CODE H§ 10-431, 12-13.7 (1974); S.D. COMPiLED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-7-1 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-235 (1974); TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 42,
§ 2031b (Vernon 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-74 (1975); VA. CODE § 8-81.2
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for contracts made or acts done within the state,13 the statutes have
been enlarged to encompass contract and tort claims against defendants
94
who have never entered the state.

Illinois, the first state to enact a comprehensive long arm statute, 3
included a provision which limited jurisdiction to causes of action growing out of the same acts upon which jurisdiction is based. 0 Other
states,97 including Oklahoma,98 have adopted similar limitations. Repeal of these sections would be the most obvious means of attempting to

increase a state's jurisdictional power. While such revision might render the statutes unconstitutional,99 the argument can be made that minimum contacts arise from the defendant's activities in the forum, as
enumerated in the statute, and once these are shown to exist, jurisdiction would exist over the nonresident defendant in relation to other,
out of state, activities. 0 0
As with all legislation, long arm statutes are subject to judicial

interpretation. One broad basis for exercising in personam jurisdiction
which is found in several long arm statutes is that of "doing business
(1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-31 (1977);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 345.09 (West 1971); Wyo. STAT. §§ 5.41-5.43 (1975).
93. See Currie, supra note 39, at 537.
94. Contract claims generally involve an out of state corporation soliciting within
the forum. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 233 (1957).
Products liability actions are usually the substance of interstate tort claims. See, e.g.,
Gray v. American Raditor & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961); Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617
(Nev. 1966); Crescent Corp. v. Martin, 443 P.2d 111 (Okla. 1968). See also Currie,
supranote 39, at 544-66.
95. 1955 Il. Laws pp. 2238, 2245-46 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17
(1968)). See Currie, supra note 39, for the history of Illinois' long arm jurisdiction.
96. The statute provides that: "Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated
herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him
is based on this Section." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(3) (1968).
97. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2501 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West
1976); N.Y. Civ. PREc. LAw § 302.2 (-McKinney 1972). See also Comment, LongArm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdictionand The Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH.
L. REv. 300, 309 n.50 (1970); Developments In The Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARv. L,REv. 909, 998-1017 (1960).
98. OKA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1701.03 (1971). See Comment, Jurisdiction: "Long-Arm"
Expansion, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 443 (1966).
99. In keeping with International Shoe and its progeny, Shaffer requires that a relationship exist among the defendant, the forum, and the ligitation. 97 S.Ct. at 2580.
Repeal of sections limiting jurisdiction to causes enumerated in the statute would remove
the requirement of a relationship to the litigation, leaving the long arm statute arguably
in violation of due process under InternationalShoe and Shaffer.
100. See Hazard, supra note 4, at 282, where the author suggests that ownership of
tangibles would subject the nonresident owner to such an action.
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"What is "doing business"?' °2

business must be conducted?

How much

When will those acts be "within the

state"? As post-Shaffer courts wrestle with these terms, they are likely
to apply more liberal standards to nonresident defendants.

Another

provision of many long arm statutes is that jurisdiction may be asserted
over the principal through the acts of his agent. 0 3 Herein lies great
potential for abuse in asserting jurisdiction over out-of-state deep

pockets.'0 4 Another possibility for creative judicial interpretation was
noted in the Shaffer dissent: Delaware courts could decide that the

legislative intent was to exert jurisdiction over defendants such as
Shaffer, and this intent would best be served by the reinterpretation
of its statute' 0 5 to permit jurisdiction based upon the quality of the con-

tacts with the forum rather than upon quasi in rem seizure of stock. 06
If not, Delaware may find it necessary to follow the crowd and adopt
07
a long arm statute.

101. E.g., CpAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 416.10 (West 1973); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §
17(1)(a) (1968); Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.610(2) (1972); Micro COMP. LAWS § 660-711

18, § 471 (1971); PA.
(1968); N.M.STAT. ANN. § 21-3-6(b) (1970); OKLA. STAT. tit.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2011(c) (Purdon Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. § 262.06(1)(d) (1971).

102. See Comment, Long Arm Wrestling in Pennsylvania: In Search of a Satisfying
Answer to In Personam Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases, 33 U. PiTr. L. REv.
839, 842 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Long Arm Wrestling]; Comment, In Personam
Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH.
L.REv. 1028, 1035-40 (1965).
103. See Currie, supra note 39, at 561-63.
the existence of a principal-agent relationship may be found on tenuous
104. That is,
grounds, in cases such as those involving independent insurance agents or self-employed
truck drivers, in order to exercise jurisdiction over the assets of the insurance company
or the party contracting with the independent driver.
105. DEL. CODE. tit. 10, § 366(a) (1974). See note 20 supra for the text.
concurring and dissenting).
106. See 97 S. Ct. at 2588 (Brennan, J.,
107. As noted in Justice Brennan's dissent in Shaffer, Delaware used DEL. CODE tit.
10, § 366 instead of a long arm statute. 97 S.Ct. at 2588-89. To replace the now
10,
unconstitutional § 366, the Delaware legislature recently enacted DEL. CODE tit.
§ 3114, reproduced in part below:
Service of Process on Non-resident Directors, Trustees or
Members of the Governing Body of Delaware Corporations
(a) Every non-resident of this State who after September 1, 1977 accepts
election or appointment as a director, trustee or member of the governing body
of a corporation organized under the laws of this State or who after June 30,
1978 serves in such capacity and every resident of this State who so accepts
election or appointment or serves in such capacity and thereafter removes his
residence from this State shall, by such acceptance or by such service, be
deemed thereby to have consented to the appointment of the registered agent
of such corporation (or, if there is none, the Secretary of State) as his agent
upon whom service of process may be made in all civil actions or proceedings
brought in this State, by or on behalf of, or against such corporation, in which
such director, trustee or member is a necessary or proper party, or in any action or proceeding against such director, trustee or member for violation of his
duty in such capacity, whether or not he continues to serve as such director,
trustee or member at the time the suit is commenced. Such acceptance or ser-

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:82

In addition to long arm statutes, states will probably adopt other

legislation designed to extend their jurisdiction.108

The Supreme

Court noted the non-existence of two such statutes in the Shatter case

which could have authorized jurisdiction: the first would require directors of state-registered corporations to own stock, 10 9 and the second
would equate acceptance of a directorship with consent to jurisdiction. 1 ' In addition, garnishment and sequestration statutes may need
refinement to fill any jurisdictional voids created by Shaffer.
Expansion of Minimum Contracts

The minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe is now the sole
standard for jurisdiction in state courts. By design, the test is inexact.
Quality of contacts, rather than quantity, is the gauge,"' and this is the

most likely area for post-Shaffer abuse by state courts reacting to a federal limitation on their power. 1 2 Examples were already evident of
vice as such director, trustee or member shall be a signification of the consent
of such director, trustee or member that any process when so served shall be
of the same legal force and validity as if served upon such director, trustee or
member within this State and such appointment of the registered agent (or, if
there is none, the Secretary of State) shall be irrevocable.

SYNOPSIS
The purpose and intent of this legislation is to fill a void in enforcement
and interpretation of Delaware corporation laws created by the decision of the
United States Supreme Court on June 24, 1977 in Schaffer v. Heitner [sic].
In that case the Court struck down 10 Del. C. § 366 which until now has frequently been the only means whereby nonresident corporate directors of Delaware Corporations could be brought before the courts of this State to answer
for their conduct in managing the affairs of the corporation. Indeed, under
10 Del. C. § 366, the Courts of this State often provided the only forum where
nonresident corporate directors of Delaware corporations from different states
could be joined in the same lawsuit for such purposes. The Supreme Court
did note that Delaware's interest in regulating the affairs of corporations governed by Delaware law could be promoted by enactment of a statute subjecting
non-resident corporate directors to the jurisdiction of the Delaware courts.
Delaware has a substantial interest in defining, regulating and enforcing
the fiduciary obligations which directors of Delaware corporations owe to such
corporations and the shareholders who elected them. In promoting that interest it is essential that Delaware afford a convenient and available forum for
supervising the affairs of Delaware corporations and the conduct of the directors of Delaware corporations, This legislation is designed to accomplish that
objective. The legislation is modeled after similar statutes in Connecticut,
North Carolina and South Carolina, which were cited as examples by the Supreme Court in the Heitner case and in Michigan.
108. See generally Long Arm Wrestling, supranote 103.
109. 97 S. Ct. at 2586 n.43; DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1976) does not require directors to be stockholders unless the corporation's articles of incorporation so
require.
110. 97 S. Ct. at 2586-87. But see note 107, supra.
111. See notes 34 & 56 supra.
112. However, the vague principles of "quality of contacts" and "traditional notions
of fair play and justice" may be a necessary evil. The courts have frequently had to
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state courts overreaching their jurisdiction in the application of mini-

mum contacts.113 Given the provocation of Shaffer, it is likely that the
limits of due process will be tested even further.1 14
If such excesses and abuses of state court jurisdiction materialize

and remain unchecked, the Supreme Court will have to redefine in personam jurisdiction, setting tighter limits and possibly imposing a more

objective test than that now employed. On the other hand, the fact
that a single standard now exists may homogenize our courts' perspec-

tives on jurisdiction. A few postscripts to ShaHer may be required, but
now that the due process abberations brought about by Pennoyer and
the concept of territorial jurisdiction are gone, a just and consistent

jurisdictional standard should be attainable.
CONCLUSION

Property remains an important factor in determining whether
jurisdiction may be properly asserted. Its presence will furnish a substantial component in ascertaining the extent of the defendant's relationship to the forum. But jurisdiction is now admittedly over the person, not over the property; consequently, some cases will fail to meet
the minimum contacts test even where property is physically present.
It is important, therefore, to view the results of Shaffer v. Heitner in
the proper perspective-the inference that quasi in rem actions survive
in their old form may lead to unconstitutional assertions of jurisdiction.
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examine the merits of the controversy, even in deciding the preliminary question of jurisdiction.
113. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957). See also The Fundamental
Test of Fairness,supra note 98, at 311-18.
114. Due Process as applied in state courts may already be stretched to its limits.
In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), the court rendered a post-Shaffer endorsement of the much criticized procedure used in Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y. 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). With the dubious distinction that Seidertype actions are sui generis, and therefore not subject to the in personam-in rem classification, the court held that the attachment of insurance obligations remained viable. This
was in spite of the language in Shaffer that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evalauated according to InternationalShoe and its progency." 97 S. Ct. at 2584-85.
Moreover, Shaffer appears to have overruled Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), on
which Seider relied. Id. at n.39.
In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently decided minimum contacts with
foreign corporations were necessary only on contractual claims, and upheld the assertion
of jurisdiction in a products liability case. Winston Ind. Inc. v. Oklahoma, 540 P.2d
572 (Okla. 1977).

